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The Marketisation of European
Corporate Control: A Critical Political
Economy Perspective
BASTIAAN VAN APELDOORN & LAURA HORN
We are entering into a new phase in EU corporate governance.
More than ever, our action plan must be focused and based on a
solid assessment of actual needs of market players and investors.1
As Charlie McCreevy, the European Commissioner for the Internal Market,
emphasises, the European Union (EU) is witnessing a transformation of its regu-
lation of corporate governance – that is, those practices that define and reflect the
power relations within the corporation and the way, and to which purpose, it is run.
At the heart of corporate governance is the issue of corporate ownership and
control. The market for corporate control, where the commodity traded is
control rights tied to a company’s shares, is assigned an ever greater role in the
external governance of corporations. Yet, at the same time, (cross-border) take-
overs are still highly contested, and the envisaged pan-European market for
corporate control clashes with national regulations, protective measures and senti-
ments. Although there has been a steep rise in European merger and acquisition
activity, most notably in hostile takeovers,2 an unfettered European market for
corporate control is still far from an economic and legal reality.
It is in this context that we see the changes in the regulation of corporate gov-
ernance in the EU as an attempt, initiated and promoted mainly by the European
Commission, to develop an EU-level regulatory framework aimed at the further
development of a European market for corporate control. Rejecting the notion
that changes in corporate governance regulation can simply be reduced to anon-
ymous market pressures selecting the most efficient arrangements,3 we argue
that it is essential to identify the inherently political and partly contingent under-
pinnings of this marketisation process. To this end, we develop a critical political
economy perspective that draws upon both Marx’s analysis of capital as a social
relation and Polanyi’s ‘institutionalist’ insights into the emergence of market
society.4 The point of departure here is that markets are not the result of
people’s supposedly innate propensity to ‘barter, truck and exchange’ (pace
Adam Smith), but are social and political constructs.
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We argue that such a construction is currently taking place at the level of supra-
national socioeconomic governance within the EU, where we see a process of
what we call marketisation of corporate control as part of a broader European mar-
ketisation project. We claim that this project is key to understanding current
changes in European corporate governance, and contemporary European capital-
ism more broadly. Although structural transformations such as the globalisation of
capital markets5 or the financialisation of contemporary capitalism6 should
undoubtedly figure prominently in any causal account of the aforementioned
changes, such structural accounts by themselves cannot offer a complete expla-
nation. They are incomplete inasmuch as they overlook the role of political and
social agency in enabling and effecting these structural changes. The point of
departure for the analysis is that a critical role is played by the EU and by the
agency of the transnational social and political forces in constituting what we
see as a European political project. In other words, to the extent that European
corporate governance is subject to processes of globalisation and financialisation,
this is in part because of the manner in which this transnational project advances
the marketisation of European corporate control.
The purpose of this article is thus two-fold. First, we seek to conceptualise the
notion of a marketisation of corporate control in terms of the social and political
constitution of markets. Second, we seek to illustrate this by examining how the
marketisation of corporate control has taken shape as a concrete political
project within the EU.7 Taken together, we intend to show the political nature
of current changes taking place in European corporate governance, rendering con-
tingent what both policy makers and academics often portray as necessary – that
is, subjecting the control of corporations, and hence the underlying social
relations, to the discipline of the market. In this way, we go beyond not only main-
stream accounts in law and economics, which often present the contingent as
necessary (and inevitable) in the name of efficiency,8 but also the ‘varieties of
capitalism’ literature, which, while viewing corporate governance regimes as a
critical part of a wider institutional ensemble, tends to take those institutions as
given and remains rather apolitical and ahistorical in much of its analysis.9 In
particular, insofar as this literature seeks to account for any institutional change,
it is reduced to exogenous influences (that is, globalisation). There is consequently
a failure to acknowledge not only the extent to which these transformations
are bound up with a political project, but also how this political project is
constituted transnationally – that is, extending across and transcending different
territorial ‘levels’ rather than contained within separate national states constrai-
ned by outside forces.10 Instead of explaining the existing national variety
of capitalism, then, our aim is to contribute to an understanding of the transna-
tional transformation of European capitalism, by analysing the case of corporate
control and by arguing how this is in part driven by a transnational marketisation
offensive.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In the first part, we discuss the
marketisation of corporate control from a theoretical and historical perspective.
We outline the institutional preconditions that have to be met for markets to
develop and explore how, in the case of corporate control, the rise of the joint-
stock company and the concomitant institution of the stock market fulfilled
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several of these preconditions. At the same time, during most of the twentieth
century, different regulatory and structural developments impaired a full market-
isation of corporate control, and hence the commodification of social relations that
make up the firm. In the second part, we apply our conceptualisation of the market-
isation of corporate control to the concrete context of the changing political
economy of the EU. Here we describe and analyse a number of recent policy
initiatives, as well as their underpinning discourse, which we see as an attempt
to promote the institutional preconditions for a European market for corporate
control.
The marketisation of corporate control in a theoretical and historical
perspective: The Modern Corporation and Private Property revisited
The issue of corporate control – the control over strategic decision making within
the corporation11– was brought into being with the rise of the joint-stock company
or modern corporation. In their classic study, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means argued that this corporate revo-
lution brought about a gradual separation of ownership and control, breaking the
link between private property and social power that is seen as a defining feature of
capitalist society.12 As ownership had become dispersed among many share-
holders, each holding only a small portion of the shares and unable to overcome
their collective action problems, corporate control allegedly came into the
hands of a new ‘class’ of professional managers, free to pursue strategies other
than that of profit maximisation.13 Contrary to this managerialist thesis,
however, we argue that there never was a full severance of ownership and
control, and that, to the extent that a severance did take place, this is now being
reversed through a reconstitution of this link through the market. To understand
how this took place, we have first to examine the constitution of capitalist
markets in general.
Marketisation: institutional preconditions for markets
Although markets have existed throughout the ages, it is only when commodities
are specifically produced for the market and the production process itself is regu-
lated by the market that we witness the emergence of a market economy, which
‘can only exist in a market society’ in the sense that such an economy involves
the subordination of ‘the substance of society itself to the laws of the market’.14
In what thus becomes capitalist production, the market constitutes not so much
an opportunity but an imperative. In such ‘a unique system of market dependence
[. . .] the dictates of the capitalist market – its imperatives of competition, accumu-
lation, profit maximisation, and increasing labour productivity – regulate not only
all economic transactions but social relations in general’.15 Social relations
between people then come to appear as ‘social relations between things’.16 Yet
markets and market society are not spontaneous orders, but rather are socially
and politically constructed.17 Here, we distinguish what we consider five key inter-
related and partly co-constitutive institutional preconditions for the development
The Marketisation of European Corporate Control
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of (capitalist) markets. These preconditions will subsequently guide our under-
standing of the marketisation of corporate control.
First, for a market to exist there need to be commodities. Marx wrote that ‘[t]he
commodity is, first of all, an external object, a thing which through its qualities
satisfies human needs of whatever kind’.18 For goods to become a commodity,
they need to be transferable to others through the medium of exchange.19 This
transferability on the market requires an ‘externality’ that is not so much a prop-
erty of the object itself, but rather an effect of specific social relations. Thus, under
capitalist social relations goods are produced directly for the market, as commod-
ities. However, in capitalism there are also objects which are not produced for the
market, but are nevertheless treated as such. With Polanyi we might call these ‘fic-
titious commodities’ – while Polanyi distinguished land, labour and money as
such fictitious commodities,20 we argue that the commodity ‘corporate control’
may also be conceptualised in this way. Fictitious commodities require an ‘exter-
nalisation’ that is dependent upon prior social and politico-legal constructions
through which these ‘things’ are separated from their natural or social environ-
ment: ‘[t]he separation, or alienation, of things as discrete entities from their
social settings, which explain their nature and their existence, is a precondition
for their commodification’.21 In fact, some ‘objects’, rather than being externa-
lised so that they can be commodified, owe their very existence to certain regu-
lations or laws. Shares are of course a case in point.
Second, since ‘commodities cannot themselves go to market and perform
exchanges’ markets depend on people as the ‘possessors of commodities’, as
‘owners of private property’.22 The importance of property rights for the existence
of markets is of course recognised by every strand of economics, but it remains
important to stress what it means in terms of social power relations. In a capitalist
society, market relations between people owning commodities are relations of
formal equality, and indeed have to be.23 Yet this equality is only present in the
realm of exchange, and conceals the fundamental power asymmetry residing in
the social relations of capitalist production as constituted by capitalist property
relations.
Third, as a medium of exchange, money is needed as a universal equivalent in
which the value of all other commodities can be expressed as a price. Hence,
money is needed to ensure equality of exchange.24 Money also permits ‘the sep-
aration of sales and purchases in space and time’,25 and therefore allows us to
move beyond direct barter, as well as to enable the rise of credit system, which
has been critical for the expansion of capitalist production and markets.26 More-
over, money is fundamental for capitalism as it is this that allows capitalist
power relations, the extraction of surplus value, to operate behind the veil of
exchange relations.27
Fourth, capitalist markets are dependent upon the unfettered operation of the
price mechanism – that is, the absence of any ‘interference with the adjustment
of price to changed market conditions’.28 At the same time, as a market needs a
plurality of independent buyers and sellers, there need to be a sufficient number
of people willing and able to buy or sell. This is also needed to ensure that
there is some measure of free competition – the principle upon which the price
mechanism rests. It is in this way that, with a sufficient number of buyers and
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sellers, constituted as ‘free’ (to enter into any contract) and ‘equal’ (before the
law) agents, the capitalist realm of market exchange, ‘the exclusive realm of
Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham [. . .] a very Eden of innate rights of
man’, comes to full bloom.29
Fifth, as support for this realm of freedom, markets depend on what Neil Flig-
stein calls rules of exchange, which define who can transact with whom and the
conditions under which transactions are carried out – for example, rules pertaining
to shipping, billing, insurance, exchange of money and the enforcement of con-
tracts.30 These rules enable markets to function inasmuch as their enforcement
(including the enforcement of contracts) is necessary for market actors to trust
that they get what they have bargained for.
These preconditions are of course not brought about by the market itself; they
are brought about politically, through the state.31 It is the state that needs to enable
certain ‘things’ to be turned into commodities, in particular enabling the creation
and reproduction of fictitious commodities;32 creating and enforcing property
rights, issuing and sustaining the value of money; ensuring sufficiently competi-
tive markets through, for example, competition law, and creating and enforcing
rules pertaining to market contracts and other forms of exchange.33 We thus
understand marketisation as a process that starts with bringing about the insti-
tutional (regulatory) preconditions for markets to arise and develop, thereby
extending the market mechanism to new areas of social life. In terms of the cre-
ation of markets, the marketisation of corporate control is bound up with the
development of the capital market, and ultimately that of the market for corporate
control. The origins of these markets lie in the emergence of the modern
corporation as the dominant production unit.
Corporate capitalism and the separation of ownership and management
As William Roy has shown, the corporation was a creation of the state and it devel-
oped from a quasi-government agency to a fully privatised institution solely
accountable to its private owners (shareholders) and controlling large sections of
industry, towards end of the nineteenth century.34 This transformation of the cor-
poration into what it is today, the epitome of private power, also transformed the
nature and composition of the capitalist class, as well as its relations with labour.
With regard to the capitalist class it must be noted that, on the one hand, the
joint-stock company implied a socialisation of capital, or what Marx saw as
‘the abolition of capital as private property within the confines of the capitalist
mode of production’.35 On the other hand, far from leading to the dissolution of
the capitalist class as managerialist writers had claimed, what took place was a
socialisation of capital within one class,36 lending it a coherence that was pre-
viously unattainable, as well as a liquidity through which it could wield its
power much more flexibly. The basis of this transformation of capitalist private
property has been the separation of ownership and management (rather than
control) through the externalisation of the former into an object – in the form
of shares – transferable through market exchange. Corporate ownership was
thus separated from the social context in which it was formerly embedded –
that is, the social relations in which the firm was owned and managed by a
The Marketisation of European Corporate Control
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single owner-entrepreneur. Marx saw this separation as leading to a bifurcation of
the capitalist class because it implied the ‘[t]ransformation of the actual function-
ing capitalist into a mere manager, in charge of other people’s capital, and of the
capital owner into a mere owner, a mere money capitalist’.37
As such, the corporate form also transformed the relations between capital and
labour. Inasmuch as corporate capital constituted a form of indirect and often
impersonal possession,38 relations between the owners of capital and those who
ultimately produce the surplus value also became more indirect and impersonal,
mediated by the bureaucracy of professional management. Indeed, these relations
became so indirect that, as Berle and Means claim, with the corporate revolution
the ‘old atom of ownership was dissolved into its component parts, control and
beneficial ownership’.39 Seen thus, ‘[t]he property rights of individuals are trans-
formed into mere financial claims upon the company’.40 Yet, attached to these
property titles are also rights with respect to control over the corporation, in par-
ticular the right to vote at annual general meetings in which the directors of a
company are (re-) appointed. These (potential) claims to corporate control (as
attached to corporate ownership), are thus also turned into commodities that are
traded on the stock market.
Rather than being a market where new capital is raised and efficiently allocated,
the stock market soon developed into a ‘mere market for the circulation of prop-
erty rights as such’.41 We can also argue that with the joint-stock company and the
concomitant institution of the stock market, money capital itself could tendentially
develop into ‘an independent power, as pure capitalist property external to pro-
duction and commodity circulation’.42 However, the potentially disciplinary
effects of this liberation of money capital vis-a`-vis productive capital were for a
long time not realised. In particular, from the inter-war period onwards, more
and more institutional and structural barriers to that capital market discipline
were being erected, such that, as Michel Aglietta and Antoine Rebe´rioux
observe, at least until the 1970s ‘corporate governance, though assuming a differ-
ent form on each side of the Atlantic, nevertheless concurred on one point: the
weakness of market mechanisms in general, and of capital market mechanisms
in particular’.43
In the United States, the lack of capital market discipline was the result not so
much of the dispersion of ownership per se, but of the growth of state law protect-
ing firms from hostile takeovers from the 1930s onwards.44 The resulting absence
of a market for corporate control was a crucial element in the rise of ‘corporate
liberalism’,45 in which the modern corporation became the central organisation
of capitalist society and relatively detached from the property-owning bourgeoi-
sie, giving space to a relatively autonomous managerial class.46
In continental Western Europe, the absence of markets for corporate control has
been critical for the development of so-called ‘non-liberal’ varieties of capital-
ism.47 Rather than coinciding with managerialism, the absence of capital market
discipline here was bound up with the continued control – often through construc-
tions like cross-shareholdings, pyramids and multiple voting rights – by large
blockholders such as banks, other industrial corporations or families. These own-
ership and control structures were backed up by a certain legal and regulatory fra-
mework and constituted structural impediments to the marketisation of corporate
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control.48 These impediments enabled a corporate governance regime organised
around stable coalitions between blockholders, managers and, to varying
degrees, workers. Owners here represented a form of committed capital with a
strategic interest, as opposed to liquid capital having a mere financial interest.49
Committed capital is bound to a particular firm, and a particular set of institutio-
nalised social relations that make up that firm. This in turn gives managers, and,
under certain conditions, workers some power vis-a`-vis these owners. From the
perspective of workers, having stable large blockowners that are ‘insiders’ to
the firm means that one has owners with whom one can bargain. Here, the
social relations between capital and labour are still embedded in personal social
interaction.
With a process that started in the closing decades of the twentieth century, some
of these regulatory and structural limitations to the discipline of the capital market,
on both sides of the Atlantic, have now been or are in the process of being undone.
Before we go on to analyse how this process is unfolding as a political project in
the EU, we should further conceptualise what we mean by the process of the
marketisation of corporate control.
The marketisation of corporate control and the (re-)integration of ownership
and control through the market mechanism
We define the marketisation of corporate control as a process through which who
controls the corporation and to what purpose it is run become increasingly
mediated by the stock market – that is, through the share price as the regulative
mechanism. Abandoning the conventional premise that control has to be exercised
by a single actor or a group of actors displaying at least a ‘minimum level’ of
cooperation,50 we argue that what we call market-based control is exercised col-
lectively by a large number of shareholders without any coordination taking place
between them except through the market. Thus also in the case of completely
dispersed share ownership – what normally, in the tradition of Berle and
Means, would be referred to as a complete separation of ownership and control
– we can observe a form of owner control, one that is not based on voice, but pri-
marily on the power of exit.51 This exit power is strongest under the conditions of a
fully fledged market for corporate control in which shareholders can exit en
masse.52
Yet a purely market-based mode of control is still rare as corporate ownership
continues to be less than completely dispersed. On the one hand, we witness a re-
concentration of ownership in the form of institutional investors such as pension
funds, mutual funds, hedge funds and so on. On the other hand, in continental
Europe we also continue to observe (albeit to a lesser degree than before) the rela-
tive concentration of ownership into the hands of ‘traditional’ blockholders.53 Our
argument, however, is that these forms of (direct) control are also increasingly
subject to market forces – that is, to the regulative mechanism of the share
price. For instance, although institutional investors increasingly own such large
stakes that their liquidity is therefore limited, making them all the more interested
in exercising control,54 the ‘voice’ that they seek and gain is still backed up by the
power of ‘exit’, even if this power is somewhat tempered in the very short run.
The Marketisation of European Corporate Control
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Institutional investors (not just the more aggressive hedge funds) adopt a purely
financial perspective, or what in Marxian terms we would call the perspective
of money capital. What these ‘investors’ do not display, then, is loyalty to the
firm of which they own a substantial stake.55 Although the more traditional block-
owners of continental Europe may be expected to display more loyalty, there is
evidence that they too – under the increasing pressures as well as temptations
of the capital market – come to adopt a money capital perspective.56
This emergence of a more market-based form of corporate control across
various established patterns of control depends on sufficiently liquid capital
markets, ultimately backed up by a market for corporate control. This means,
first, that ownership is not so concentrated as to make most corporations
essentially privately held firms; second, that a large number of those owners is
able and, under the right market conditions, willing to sell their stakes; and
third, that the buying and selling of shares can actually take place to such
an extent that a single market actor can gain full control over what then is no
longer an independent enterprise. We have to treat the fulfilment of these
conditions as a continuum – the more these markets develop, the more corporate
control will be mediated by the market.
Although institutionally overlapping, an analytical distinction must be made
between capital markets and markets for corporate control.57 While the trading
of companies has been a factor in economic life in early capitalist times and
even before, the market for corporate control is a fairly recent development in
mature capitalist societies.58 As a secondary market, it is dependent on the exist-
ence of a liquid and functioning capital market, but the commodity traded here is
control linked to shares rather than the share as bearer of certain rights to residual
profits. There is thus a qualitative difference between the capital market and the
market for corporate control in that, whereas the former provides liquidity, the
commodity traded on the latter is (control over) the very producer of commodities,
in other words, the corporation itself becomes a commodity.59
In the market for corporate control the share price becomes a disciplinary
device vis-a`-vis management; it is thus seen as the external control mechanism
par excellence to ensure the protection of shareholder interests, aligning manage-
rial strategies with the latter.60 Corporate governance, in this context, simply refers
to ‘how investors get the managers to give them back their money’.61 The evalu-
ation of company performance takes place solely on financial criteria – in the case
of a takeover, ‘shareholders are not asked to evaluate complex alternative business
plans for the company. Rather, they need only assess who is offering a higher
value for their shares.’62 Technical or structural barriers to takeovers are thus
perceived as detrimental to shareholder interests.
Yet even if a particular company may not itself be exposed to the threat of a
hostile takeover (for instance, because of certain anti-takeover defences),
shareholders of that firm may still obtain leverage over its management
through the threat of exit, submitting the performance of firms to monitoring
by the capital market and thus to a form of market-based control.63 Next to
the threat of being replaced, managers may also care about the share price
because their own financial interests are tied to it through, for example, stock
options;64 or because the company’s credit ratings and thus its ability to
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attract loan capital depend on it; or because the company seeks to take over
(through equity swaps) other companies whose share price is lower; or,
finally, because keeping the share price high is just held to be a standard of
good corporate governance that managers have internalised, conditioned by
the competitive environment in which they operate.
Marketisation and the discipline of money capital: deepening the
commodification of the social relations of the firm
The marketisation of corporate control puts the firm, its management and
workers more firmly under the discipline of the capital market and the market
for corporate control. As such the marketisation of corporate control represents
the tendential emancipation of money capital (vis-a`-vis production) that, as
noted above, had its origins in the corporate form and the separation of owner-
ship from management but was subsequently impaired in its disciplinary power
by structural and regulatory impediments. Share ownership, particularly in its
liquid rather than committed form, represents money capital (in the Marxian
sense) in its most general and abstract form embodying the total process of
capital accumulation.65 As David Harvey writes, money capital ‘express[es]
the power of capitalist property outside of and external to any specific process
of commodity production’.66 The money capitalist can abstract from this con-
crete production process and its material, technical and social requirements,
whereas the productive capitalist cannot. As such, in ideal-typical terms,
money capital tends to have a more liberal perspective – adhering to Polanyi’s
ideal of the self-regulating market – than productive capital.67 With the market-
isation of corporate control the perspective of money capital increasingly comes
to reign over productive capital. At the level of the firm, this is expressed most
clearly in the rise of ‘shareholder value’ as the new ideological paradigm for
corporate governance.68
All of this is not to say that the marketisation of corporate control should be
viewed simply in terms of a power shift in which owners win and managers
lose. What the latter may lose in decision-making autonomy over the firm, they
may win in terms of financial compensation and international career mobility.
Although we interpret part of the struggle over corporate control as a struggle
between different segments of the capitalist class, and the marketisation of corpor-
ate control as implying a reconfiguration of those segments and their power
relations, we should also examine the implications for the relation with, and pos-
ition of, labour, as the capitalist class as a whole, including Marx’s ‘mere
manager’, comes to adopt more of a money capital perspective.69
Empirical evidence offered by Henk De Jong shows that in market-based
regimes about three to four times the share of net added value is being paid to
shareholders than in regimes characterised by the absence of a market for corpor-
ate control.70 Capital market pressures re-orient managers to short-term financial
performance; that is, they have constantly to increase the rate of the return on
capital in order to satisfy mobile shareholders. This translates into a corporate
strategy of ‘downsize and distribute’ – to the shareholders.71 In other words,
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the redistribution between capital and labour is brought about by a process of cor-
porate restructuring imposed by the discipline of money capital.72
The corporate restructuring engendered by the external market mechanism of
the capital market and the market for corporate control is, in turn, taking the
form of increased competition within the firm, in particular between its different
units for which increasingly specific targets of profitability (or return on capital
employed) are imposed. This internalised competition has a significant impact
upon established systems of industrial relations. As Martin Ho¨pner has shown,
although the institutional form of German industrial relations, in particular
co-determination, for now remains largely intact, its function changes from that
of a project integrally formed on a societal scale to a firm-oriented scheme.73
As a result of the redistributive consequences of the marketisation of corporate
control – with the relative share of labour declining as the firm shrinks its activi-
ties to its so-called core competencies – trade union representatives within the
firm also become increasingly oriented to micro-efficiency and performance, a
re-orientation that acts to undermine unionist macro-solidarity.
What all of this boils down to is that the marketisation of corporate control
deepens the commodification of the social relations that make up the firm as
they become increasingly mediated by the capital market. These social relations,
which are involved in the material and social reproduction of the firm as a social
institution, are thus further obscured, as that institution, or pieces thereof, become
treated as a commodity. In corporations over which owners can exercise control
through the market, labour power thus becomes a commodity owned by the cor-
poration, which in turn is owned and controlled by largely anonymous share-
holders, or at least by shareholders whose ties to the firm are purely financial.
This deepening commodification must be viewed as inherent in the ‘fictitious’
nature of the commodity into which corporate control, and ultimately the corpor-
ation itself, is turned with the rise of a market for corporate control. As Polanyi
argued, the ‘commodity fiction’, in particular with regard to land and labour, is
fundamental to the extension of the market principle and the rise of market
society:
The commodity fiction, therefore, supplies a vital organizing prin-
ciple in regard to the whole of society affecting almost all its insti-
tutions in the most varied way, namely, the principle according to
which no arrangement or behaviour should be allowed to exist that
might prevent the actual functioning of the market mechanism on
the lines of the commodity fiction.74
With the emergence of a market for corporate control, then, the corporation is
assigned an exchange value, which is turned into what Marx called a ‘social hier-
oglyphic’.75 Once assigned a value, it is difficult to conceive of commodities as
having a meaning outside the market space since they suddenly appear to have
an intrinsic value separate from their societal embedding.
We see the market for corporate control as constituting an important step in the
evolution of capitalism as an ongoing process of commodification. Whereas
capital markets, albeit to varying degrees, have developed from the late nineteenth
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century onwards, markets for corporate control have started to emerge only in the
final decades at the end of the last century, first in the USA and the UK, and even
only much more recently in continental Europe.
The rise of the market for corporate control and the transformation of
post-war capitalism
The marketisation of corporate control first started to make its imprint upon
corporate governance in the USA (followed by the UK), with the wave of dereg-
ulation with respect to (corporate) finance that occurred during the adminis-
tration of Ronald Reagan.76 This produced, in combination with technical
innovations, a huge takeover boom,77 which coincided with rising ‘shareholder
activism’ – that is, unhappy (institutional) shareholders clamouring for their
‘rights’ in what could be described as a ‘revolt’ on the part of formerly
passive owners.78
In continental Europe, developments in the 1990s indicate that a market for
corporate control is emerging here too.79 The volume of unsolicited takeover
bids in the EU has been increasing steadily, and the number now actually sur-
passes the number of takeovers in the US.80 The rise of institutional investors
has been staggering in terms of the total financial assets (including shares)
they control relative to gross domestic product (GDP),81 as well as in terms
of the proportion of shares they own in Europe’s largest companies.82
Within some of these companies, these financially oriented investors do not
only exercise a degree of control over management, but they are in some
cases also in the position to decide the company’s fate when it is subject
to a takeover bid.83 Moreover, as these are often foreign (in particular
British and American) funds, the marketisation of corporate control coincides
with a transnationalisation of corporate control. Concomitantly with the rise of
institutional investors there has also been a relative decline of traditional large
blockowners, above all of the state as owner with the privatisation waves of
the 1980s and 1990s, as well as a re-orientation of remaining blockholders
towards maximising the return on their long-standing investment. All of this
may be seen as indicative of a tendential rise of a shareholder capitalism
even within continental Europe, threatening the erosion of Europe’s non-
liberal varieties of capitalism premised on stable coalitions of so-called
stakeholders.84
In creating the conditions for this European shareholder capitalism to emerge, a
critical role, both directly and indirectly, is played by the process of European
integration, which, since the end of the 1980s, has been driven by a largely neo-
liberal marketisation project. We do not claim that the regulatory changes with
regard to corporate governance exclusively emanate from the EU. Rather, this
regulatory transformation must be viewed as a transnational process where
changes take place simultaneously at different levels. What we see as a project
of market liberalisation at the EU level must be taken as both an expression
and a constituting force of this transnational process. It is in this sense that
many of the recent regulatory changes on the national level can only be under-
stood in the context of the European integration process.
The Marketisation of European Corporate Control
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The marketisation of corporate control as a European project
Adopting a critical transnational political economy perspective that focuses on the
socioeconomic content of the integration process as an outcome of political and
ideological struggles within a transnational political arena,85 we interpret the mar-
ketisation of corporate control as a political project. By this we refer to ‘initiatives
and propositions that, as pragmatic responses to concrete national and European
problems, conceptually and strategically further the process of socio-economic,
societal and institutional restructuring’.86 This project is as part and parcel of a
broader neoliberal project of European integration, supported and to an extent
propagated by globalising European capital since the early 1990s. It has become
manifest in the whole internal market programme, within Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), and with efforts to promote the liberalisation of European labour
markets (and thus the further commodification of labour) in the name of ‘competi-
tiveness’. The role of the European Commission in establishing and executing
this project is crucial. Yet the European Commission, although indeed an import-
ant supranational public actor, whose role as policy entrepreneur is also strongly
confirmed by our case of European corporate governance regulation, must not
be interpreted as an autonomous actor in the way some ‘supranationalist’ accounts
of European integration tend to do.87 Rather, the Commission can be viewed as a
key public actor within the EU as a ‘multi-level state formation’,88 and as such
embedded in a particular configuration of transnational social forces – first and
foremost, those forces bound up with transnational capital. As such, the agency
of the Commission must be seen as shaped by a concomitant transnational (and
potentially hegemonic) construction and articulation of interests.89
Since the late 1990s the European marketisation project has been entering the
area of corporate control. As indicated, the marketisation of corporate control is
dependent upon the development of an active and liquid capital market and, ulti-
mately, a functioning market for corporate control. The former has in fact been
an integral part of the internal market programme.90 As we argue below, the
marketisation of corporate governance and specifically of corporate control has
subsequently been built upon this integration of Europe’s capital markets.
Financial market integration and the marketisation of European corporate
governance
The speed with which financial market integration was implemented was at first
rather impressive, helped along by the ‘Europhoria’ in the second half of the
1980s. Yet, it was only in the second half of the 1990s that the neoliberal
project fully took shape and rose towards hegemony, at least at the level of
the European elite discourse.91 In this context, a number of new initiatives
have been undertaken by the EU to accelerate and complete the creation of
the single financial market. These initiatives, in tune with the broader neoliberal
marketisation project, started with the Cardiff Council of 1998, which called for
the Commission to develop an action plan for removing the remaining obstacles
to an integrated financial market. The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)
turned financial market integration into one of the EU’s top priorities.92
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The FSAP constitutes an integral part of the Commission’s ‘Lisbon strategy’,
which articulates the goal of competitiveness with that of ‘social cohesion’, but
in a way that makes the latter subordinate to the exigencies of the former, as
defined by a neoliberal competitiveness discourse underpinning the neoliberal
integration project, and widening its appeal across different social forces.93
Although the Lisbon ‘reform process’ has recently come under much criticism
because of its lack of implementation, most progress has in fact been made in
the area of financial market integration under the heading of the FSAP.94 The
then Commissioner for the Internal Market, Frits Bolkestein, explained how
this ‘core of the Lisbon strategy’ is bound up with the goal of competitiveness:
Without a fully integrated financial services and capital market in
Europe we shall be unable to release the economic opportunities
that will underpin the Union’s new competitiveness. Without this
the cost of capital will remain too high and the yields on assets
unnecessarily low.95
In other words, integrating financial markets is about ‘sufficiently rewarding’
holders of liquid assets. It is thus about a redistribution from ‘stakeholders’ to
shareholders, though at the same time the claim is upheld that financial market
integration ‘will lead to a higher quality of life for all European citizens. A
large, more liquid capital market in Europe will create investment, more
growth, more innovation, more jobs and higher incomes.’96
The marketisation of corporate control constitutes an increasingly central
element of the Commission’s overall strategy towards (financial) market inte-
gration in the EU. The Commission’s 2003 Action Plan for ‘Modernising
Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance’ frames its plans for corpor-
ate governance reform essentially in the same notions of competitiveness and
efficiency that also underlie its agenda for capital market integration, by arguing
that ‘a dynamic and flexible company law is essential for deepening the internal
market and building an integrated European capital market. An effective approach
will foster the global efficiency and competitiveness of business in the EU [. . .]
and will help to strengthen shareholder rights.’97
In the next section, we illustrate the notion of the marketisation of corporate
control by looking at a number of concrete regulatory initiatives. By interpreting
these in terms of bringing about preconditions for a capitalist market by the state
(or, in this case, the supranational agency of the Commission), we stress
the fundamentally political nature of this process. While our main focus is the
discursive construction of the marketisation project and identifying the overall
ideological and strategic thrust of this neoliberal offensive,98 we will also, albeit
to a lesser extent, seek to demonstrate how this marketisation project has been
translated in and mediated by concrete policy instruments.
Establishing the preconditions
The EU continues to play a vital role in establishing a regulatory framework con-
ducive to the further integration of European capital markets. As McCreevy
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argues, ‘financial services and capital market integration is one of the main roads
to improved competitiveness for the EU financial sector and the European
economy as a whole’.99 Regulation is increasingly seen as a means to stabilise
and improve market conditions, rather than to provide for social cohesion by
taking the edge off the societally adverse consequences of the capitalist market
system.100 Bolkestein put this very bluntly by asserting that ‘the responsibility
of the regulator is to set up the framework, which then enables the markets to
play their disciplining role in an efficient way’.101
It appears that, within the framework of European market integration, the
purpose of regulation is increasingly assumed to be to serve the exigencies of ‘effi-
cient’ and well-functioning capitalist markets. At the same time, it is regulation
that establishes the preconditions necessary for the formation and maintenance
of these markets in the first place:
There is no doubt that, particularly in financial markets, regulation
has a crucial role to play. Without legal certainty, without reliable
information, without clear framework rules markets cannot work
for long. So a stable, reliable and transparent regulatory environ-
ment is essential. But [i]t is economic freedom that lets markets
best play their role [...] Legislation has to help, not hinder, this
process – working with the ebbs and flows of markets.102
We now turn to the five interrelated and mutually constitutive institutional pre-
conditions for a capitalist market (for corporate control), and their articulation in
regulatory initiatives pertaining to corporate governance in the EU. To this aim,
we identify the objectives underlying the discursive construction of the marketisa-
tion project. Consequently, we illustrate how, and to what extent, these initiatives
have been translated into concrete policies.
Corporate control as a commodity. As noted above, the fictitious commodity of
corporate control originated in the separation of ownership and management
and the alienability of the former in the form of shares traded on the stock
market. Although control rights were in principle attached to this commodity,
structural and institutional impediments blocked the development of a fully
fledged market for corporate control. As such, the commodification of
(control over) the corporation remained limited for a large part of the twentieth
century. However, it is precisely this commodity fiction that is now being pro-
moted at the level of EU corporate governance regulation and related policy dis-
course. Specifically, we observe here the social and political construction of
corporate control, and ultimately the corporation itself, as an ‘asset’ to be
traded on the market.103 The Commission has repeatedly expressed its belief
in the efficiency of the market for corporate control or, as Bolkestein put it,
a market where ‘the good can take over and improve the bad’.104 As he
explained on another occasion:
Companies must be exposed not just to the scrutiny of their owners
but also to that of the wider market. New management may be
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needed to improve the overall efficiency and thus real investor
returns. Even what is sometimes seen as the menace of takeovers
offers a valuable discipline to firms and their management.105
As an expression of this understanding of the nature of corporate control as a
commodity, the 2004 Takeover Directive serves as a prime case in point. Intended
to ‘facilitate the restructuring of the financial industry [..] and mark an important
milestone in the emergence of an open market in EU corporate ownership’,
and thus to promote the development of a pan-European market for corporate
control,106 it represents an important stepping stone towards the marketisation
of corporate control in the EU inasmuch as it not only sets the regulatory stage
for further advances in this direction, but also because it promotes the perception
of corporations as commodities. While the Member States and the European Par-
liament rejected several draft versions over national differences in takeover
defences and other legal arrangements, the perception of corporate control as a
commodity exchangeable on the market was not questioned at all.107 Although
the compromise form of the 2004 Takeover Directive, which had been watered
down considerably in the European Parliament, provides Member States and
firms with a certain degree of optionality with regard to the removal of structural
barriers and the neutrality of management in case of a takeover bid,108 these
provisions have nevertheless been established as the dominant norm. This then
helps to underpin the discursive and political construction of corporate control,
and of the corporation, as a commodity. At the same time, the non-optional
provisions of the Directive introduce a regulatory setting that establishes a
variety of measures conducive to the other preconditions discussed below, in par-
ticular disclosure and transparency rules. These can be perceived as ‘a cornerstone
of the effective operation of capital markets and the market of corporate
control’.109
The Commission stresses the importance of a regulatory framework enhan-
cing transparency by pointing out that ‘our action has been based on two key
principles: (1) bringing more transparency in the way companies operate; and
(2) empowering shareholders’.110 It is the latter ‘key principle’ to which we
now turn.
‘The shareholder democracy’: property rights discourses. Central to our argu-
ment about the marketisation of corporate control are the property rights attached
to the ‘commodity’ of corporate control and the claims to residual profits. Accord-
ing to Fligstein, a ‘world market for corporate control’ has not emerged yet since
‘property rights were at the core of the relations between national elites and states.
Most national elites have resisted having property rights transferred to the highest
bidder because they would lose power.’111 While this may hold for the creation of
markets by nation-states, the emerging marketisation project in the EU is clearly of
a transnational nature – that is, it transcends the interests of purely national elites
or classes and is in fact premised on an evolving transnational class structure or the
formation of a (European and global) transnational capitalist class.112 It aims at the
constitution of property rights, detached from national concerns, on the basis of
transnational capitalist interests. National regulation upholding national interests
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thus clashes with the transnational orientation of the marketisation process. An
illustration would be the Commission’s crusade against ‘golden shares’ and
other instruments allowing governments to retain majority control over
corporations.113
These arguments are based on the assumption not only that corporate control
ought to be exclusively in the hands of the shareholders, but also that no share-
holders should be privileged (through certain legal constructions as golden
shares, multiple voting rights and so on) over any other shareholders, in particular
so called minority shareholders. This assumption crucially informs the regulatory
initiatives aimed at strengthening the position of (minority) shareholders; as the
Commission puts it, ‘shareholders should be able to play an effective role as the
owners of the companies in which they invest’.114 For the Commission this is a
matter of shareholders exercising their property rights, including control rights.
Considering the latter to be ‘fundamental rights’,115 the Commission understands
its own function as ‘to sort out the plumbing for the exercise of cross-border voting
rights. We will guard against disturbing the proper balance between shareholders
and management.’116
The regulatory initiatives aimed at providing (minority) shareholder protec-
tion, and strengthening the position of shareholders in general, are framed in
terms of a ‘shareholder democracy’.117 The underlying assumption of ‘share-
holder democracy’ is that control by the owners reduces the need for regulation
and will further the efficiency of the market. Yet, it is acknowledged that regu-
lation is needed to bring about this situation in the first place, that is to secure the
(property) rights of shareholders and turn them collectively into ‘king or
queen’,118 equal in rights among each other and sovereign vis-a`-vis any other
group within the firm.
While so-called academic experts and capital market actors are generally in
favour of strengthening the proportionality of ownership and control, the principle
of ‘one share one vote’ is heavily contested.119 Most importantly, Member States
in which publicly listed companies have complex multiple voting right schemes
(such as in Scandinavia) as well as some business associations oppose the intro-
duction of binding rules in this respect. In light of these controversies, the Com-
mission currently is conducting a study in which the various national and
international practices pertaining to ownership and control, and the economic
impact of deviations from the principle of proportionality, are being mapped
and analysed. The general expectation is that the outcome of this study will
provide the Commission with new ammunition to promote the introduction of
this principle.120
Money – mediating transnational exchange. Money as a medium of exchange is
yet another essential precondition for capitalist market systems. In the context of
the integration of European capital markets, the pre-eminent project in this regard
is the EMU.121 As Hans-Ju¨rgen Bieling argues, ‘its structural impact has been very
strong, [promoting] far-reaching changes in the overall mode of reproduction of
European capitalism’.122 Stimulating corporations and financial institutions to
operate on a pan-European scale, monetary union promotes cross-border
trade and investment and hence cross-border ownership structures. Specifically,
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‘investors’ are led to diversify their portfolios across the eurozone as the
single currency reduces transaction costs for cross-border trade in stocks and
bonds.123 This reinforces the trend towards a transnationalisation of corporate
control inasmuch as EMU and its concomitant regulatory framework are increas-
ingly aimed at providing cross-border investment opportunities for transnational
financial capital. As cross-border mergers and takeovers are also facilitated in
this way, EMU promotes the further development of a pan-European market for
corporate control.124
With regard to the market for corporate control, it is also notable that the ‘cur-
rency’ used in acquisitions and takeovers can also be shares. Since these are
ultimately mediated through money themselves, this practice is not at odds with
the above arguments. Yet it entails even more clearly another precondition for
the functioning of a capitalist market, namely, regulation to enhance transparency
and disclosure.
Getting the price (mechanism) right – transparency and disclosure. The
absence of practices interfering with the free operation of the price mechanism,
as well as regulation that actively helps to ensure a sufficient degree of compe-
tition, are essential for the functioning of a capitalist market system. With
regard to the market for corporate control, the latter implies the development of
an integrated and sufficiently liquid European capital market (that is, with suffi-
cient buyers and sellers and free competition amongst them or their representa-
tives). As we have seen, this has been an integral part of the single market
programme from the start. The former implies that share prices (as a financial
asset) are free to adjust to market conditions and to the assessment of supposedly
‘rational’ investors. To enable investors to make decisions about corporate control
transactions they need to be able to base their decisions on reliable information
about the ‘value’ of corporations. Here the disclosure of corporate and financial
assets plays an important role for the functioning of the price mechanism.125 As
Bolkestein argued, ‘disclosure elements are a highly effective market-led way
of rapidly achieving results [...] better disclosure will help the markets to play
their disciplining role’.126
Within EU financial market and corporate governance regulation, several regu-
latory initiatives have been aimed at improving transparency and disclosure, most
notably the 2003 Prospectus Directive (2003/71/EC) and the 2004 Transparency
Directive (2004/109/EC). Supranational regulation aimed at establishing stable
and reliable disclosure standards is in fact indispensable with respect to bringing
about a convergence of these standards. This also implies the need for a stable
set of EU-wide rules of exchange providing the institutional framework for the
functioning of capitalist markets.
The rules of exchange. As McCreevy claims, ‘for investors, convergence and
equivalence would make it easier to compare the performance of companies
and make better investment decisions. Equivalence will also further the integration
of global financial markets and thereby promote economic growth and prosperity
– not just in the EU but globally.’127 We find the same reasoning in the OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance:
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The rules and procedures governing the acquisition of corporate
control in the capital markets [. . .] should be clearly articulated
and disclosed so that investors understand their rights and recourse.
Transactions should occur at transparent prices and under fair con-
ditions that protect the rights of all shareholders according to their
class.128
As Fligstein argues, ‘much of the market-making project is to find ways to
stabilise and routinize competition’.129 Rules of exchange help stabilise and
enhance market conditions by ensuring that exchanges occur under conditions
that apply to all market participants. This is of particular importance for cross-
border corporate governance issues, and for facilitating smooth market access
for transnational investors. Again, the removal of national barriers for market
participants thus constitutes a vital aspect of the transnational marketisation of
corporate control.
The Commission’s efforts in establishing preconditions for cross-border trans-
actions should be seen in this context. The Commission has issued a proposal for
cross-border voting rights that is currently being discussed in the European Parlia-
ment (EP), in which it aims at enabling shareholders to exercise their voting rights
in cross-border shareholding.130 The European Company statute, offering the
possibility to set up a Societas Europae (SE) under a single set of rules applying
throughout the EU, could also be interpreted as a move towards rendering the rules
of exchange pertaining to corporate control more favourable to the interests of
(transnational) investors as it facilitates and stimulates the restructuring of Euro-
pean industry and business by easing the cross-border differences between
national regulatory environments.
In lieu of a conclusion: European integration and the marketisation of
corporate control
The policy initiatives advanced by the EU exemplify that the regulatory frame-
work is indeed aimed at promoting what we have identified as a marketisation
of corporate control through the establishment of the right institutional precondi-
tions. Regulation, in this context, is assumed to have to be adapted to the ‘require-
ments of a dynamic economy’, while ever more areas of economic life have to be
subjected to the full workings of the capital market – as McCreevy argues, ‘we
cannot keep important sectors of our economies sheltered from market
forces’.131 The role of European regulators, then, is to ‘help the markets to help
themselves’, since ‘ultimately, it is only market participants, many of whom
already operate on a pan-European if not global basis, that can drive the necessary
changes’.132
The ideology underpinning the EU’s marketisation project, part of a broader
European liberalisation project that has been increasingly defining the socioeco-
nomic content of the integration process since the late 1980s, thus subscribes to
Polanyi’s organising principle of the self-regulating market. On the other hand,
it recognises that the self-regulating market does not come into existence by
itself, but that it needs a ‘helping hand’. It is the market, or rather capital
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compelled by the market to go on expanding itself through continuous accumu-
lation, that needs to establish the necessary discipline, impose a logic of commo-
dification on the firm as a social institution, and restructure European industry.
But it is public regulation that needs to enable this process. It is questionable
whether with this realisation comes an awareness that regulation is necessary
not only to bring new areas of social life under the discipline of the market
mechanism and promote the process of marketisation, but also, in a Polanyian
vein, to sustain capital accumulation in the longer run by protecting society
from the most destructive effects of marketisation, and thus temporarily solve
the contradiction that capitalism tends to destroy the social substratum which
nourishes it.
The project of the marketisation of corporate control is supported by powerful
transnational social forces, in particular those forces that stand to benefit most
from it – that is, transnationally mobile financial capital or, more generally,
those capitalist interests associated with a money capital perspective.133 At the
same time it important to underline that the marketisation of corporate control
is very much a project in the making, and as such is open to contestation by a
wide array of actors – among others, Member States trying to protect national
champions, business associations seeking to reduce the regulatory and administra-
tive burden, managers seeking to preserve or regain some of their decision-making
autonomy, trade unions worrying about the position of (organised) labour, and
Members of the European Parliament doubting the compatibility of the marketisa-
tion of corporate control with the principles of the European Social Model. Yet,
the European Commission continues to cling to its faith in ‘the market’ as the
panacea for Europe’s alleged economic ills. Indeed, the above analysis serves
as testimony to this. Whether the fiction of the corporation as a commodity can
in the end be sustained is another matter.
Notes
The authors would like to thank Bob Jessop, Andreas No¨lke, James Perry, Henk Overbeek, Arjan Vliegenthart,
Angela Wigger and three anonymous referees for their constructive comments on earlier versions of this paper.
The usual disclaimers apply.
1. Charlie McCreevy, ‘The European Corporate Governance Action Plan: Setting Priorities’, Speech at the
Second European Corporate Governance Conference, Luxembourg, 28 June 2005 (emphasis added).
2. See, for example, David Wells & Lina Saigol, ‘Hostile bids are back: companies have targets in their sights
and bankers foresee lucrative transactions’, Financial Times, 18 February 2004, p. 11; James Politi & Lina
Saigol, ‘Europe outpaces US in volume of deals’, Financial Times, 26 September 2005, p. 25; James Politi &
Lina Saigol, ‘M&A fever surpasses dotcom era – global deal-making for first half of year poised to hit dollars
1,930bn’, Financial Times, 30 June 2006, p. 17; and James Politi & Lina Saigol, ‘Rise in hostile bids pushes
M&A to record – unsolicited approaches double last year’s figure: switch to shorter-term views fuelling the
boom’, Financial Times, 29 September 2006, p. 21.
3. As maintained by, for example, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate
Law’, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2001), p. 56.
4. What is ‘institutionalist’ in Polanyi’s work is his emphasis on the institutional preconditions (including the
enabling role of the state) for a capitalist market economy to emerge and be sustained. In contrast to some
more functionalist interpretations of his work though, and in contrast to some ‘new institutionalisms’, we
emphasise from a Marxian political economy perspective that institutions themselves are empty if not for
the content given to them by social forces and their struggles. In other words, institutions are the outcome
as well as the medium of underlying social relations (cf. Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C. R. Taylor, ‘Political
The Marketisation of European Corporate Control
229
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
0:
49
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
Science and the Three New Institutionalisms’, Political Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (1996), pp. 936–57). Beyond
Polanyi our ‘institutionalism’ is also indebted to work in economic sociology. See, especially, Neil Fligstein,
The Architecture of Markets: An Economic Sociology of Twenty-First Century Capitalist Societies (Princeton
University Press, 2001), and William G. Roy, Socializing Capital. The Rise of the Large Industrial
Corporation in America (Princeton University Press, 1997).
5. See, for example, Michael Useem, ‘Corporate Leadership in a Globalizing Equity Market’, Academy of Man-
agement Executive, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1998), pp. 43–59; Mary O’Sullivan, ‘Corporate Governance and Globa-
lisation’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, No. 570 (July 2000), pp. 153–72.
6. See, for example, Michel Aglietta & Antoine Rebe´rioux, Corporate Governance Adrift: A Critique of
Shareholder Value (Edward Elgar, 2005).
7. Due to the limits of a single journal article, we here limit ourselves to the more modest task of describing and
interpreting, informed by a preceding theorisation of the marketisation of this political and ideological
project as articulated at the EU-level corporate control.
8. This applies, for example, to much of the so-called agency theory. See Michael Jensen & William
H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’,
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1976), pp. 305–60; Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, ‘Sep-
aration of Ownership and Control’, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1983), p. 16. In this
respect, we may also argue that much of this literature is implicitly or explicity rather normative and prescrip-
tive in its orientation. On this, see also Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek & Andreas No¨lke, ‘The
Transnational Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation: Introducing Key Concepts, Questions and
Approaches’, in Henk Overbeek, Bastiaan van Apeldoorn & Andreas No¨lke (eds), The Transnational Politics
of Corporate Governance Regulation (Routledge, 2007).
9. See Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in Peter A. Hall & David
Soskice (eds), Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 1–68. Whereas we share with the
varieties of capitalism approach the notion of the indispensability of public regulation in the constitution of
markets, we take public regulation here not just as an independent variable but as part of our explanandum –
with politics (such as the construction of a particular political project) as the explanans. On this, see also van
Apeldoorn et al., ‘The Transnational Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation’. For a notable exception
to the ahistoricity of the varieties of capitalism literature, see Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura (eds),
The Origins of Non-Liberal Capitalism (Cornell University Press, 2002). For a recent attempt to make sense
of contemporary changes in historical varieties of capitalism, and to underline the politics of those changes,
see Colin Crouch, Capitalist Diversity and Change. Recombinant Governance and Institutional Entrepreneurs
(Oxford University Press, 2005). Finally, we may also note that although we share the emphasis the approach
puts on the role of institutions in the organisation of capitalist political economies, we go beyond the institutional
analysis of most of this literature by starting with the institutional preconditions of the capitalist market in general
(starting with fundamental categories like ‘the commodity), rather than focusing on the institutional dimension
of its variation across space. We thus enquire about what much of the varieties of corporatism literature
(especially Hall & Sockice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’) takes as a given.
10. Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, ‘Theorising the Transnational: A Historical Materialist Approach’, Journal of
International Relations and Development, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2004), p. 144.
11. John Scott, Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 37.
12. Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction
Publishers, 1991 [1932]).
13. James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (Greenwood Press, 1975 [1941]), p. 223.
14. Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Beacon Press,
1957 [1944]), p. 71.
15. Ellen M. Wood, The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View (Verso, 2002), p. 7.
16. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Penguin: 1990 [1867]), p. 166.
17. cf. Polanyi, The Great Transformation.
18. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 125.
19. Ibid., p. 131.
20. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p. 72.
21. Helen Raduntz, ‘The Economy of Uncertainty, Marketisation and the Direction of Educational Change’,
paper presented at the Conference of the Australian Association for Education Research, Brisbane, 1–5
December 2002, p. 3.
22. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 178.
Bastiaan van Apeldoorn & Laura Horn
230
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
0:
49
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
23. See, for example, Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State (Polity, 2002), p. 39; Marx, Capital, Vol. 1,
p. 271.
24. David Harvey, Limits to Capital (Verso, 1999 [1982]), pp. 19–20.
25. Ibid., p. 245.
26. Daniel Ankarloo & Giulio Palermo, ‘Anti-Williamson: A Marxian Critique of New Institutional Economics’,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 28 (2004), p. 424; Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Penguin, 1991 [1894]),
p. 612.
27. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, pp. 168–9.
28. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p. 69.
29. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 280.
30. Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets, p. 35.
31. Ibid.; see also Polanyi, The Great Transformation; Wood, The Origin of Capitalism.
32. See Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, p. 45.
33. Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets, p. 34.
34. Roy, Socializing Capital, pp. 16–18; cf. Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business (Greenwood, 1977).
35. Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, p. 567.
36. Roy, Socializing Capital, p. 12.
37. Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, pp. 567–8.
38. Roy, Socializing Capital, pp. 15–20; 37–8.
39. Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation, p. 8.
40. Scott, Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes, p. 38; see also Marx, Capital, Vol. 3, p. 599.
41. Harvey, Limits to Capital, p. 299; see also Douglas Henwood, Wall Street (Verso, 1998), p. 57.
42. Harvey, Limits to Capital, p. 276.
43. Aglietta & Rebe´rioux, Corporate Governance Adrift, p. 2.
44. Mark Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton
University Press, 1994), p. 230.
45. Kees van der Pijl, The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (Verso, 1984).
46. The managerialist thesis has in fact never been fully correct, not even in the USA during its so called heyday
in the 1960s. See Ronald Dore, William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, ‘Varieties of Capitalism in the Twen-
tieth Century’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1999), p. 109. As many empirical studies
have shown, the dispersal of share ownership has only rarely been so advanced as to eliminate any controlling
interest. In fact, many corporations, also in the USA, continued to be controlled or at least influenced by large
shareowners through a variety of ways, sometimes – in a popular neo-Marxist theory derived from Hilferd-
ing – through networks of so called ‘finance capitalists’ On this see, for example, Maurice Zeitlin, ‘Corporate
Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class’, American Journal of Sociology,
Vol. 81, No 4 (1974), pp. 1073–119. We argue, however, that if we want to understand the current market-
isation of corporate control we have to move beyond these familiar critiques of managerialism, which miss
the fundamental point that even in the absence of the ownership of a large block of shares of a single firm, or
control by finance capital, capitalist owners may, under certain institutional conditions, still exercise control
collectively through the market mechanism.
47. Wolfgang Streeck, The Transformation of Corporate Governance in Europe: An Overview, MPIfG Working
Papers 01/08, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne, 2001; Martin Ho¨pner & Gregory
Jackson, An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The Mannesmann Takeover and German Corporate
Governance, MPIfG Discussion Papers 01/04, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne,
2001.
48. Ronald J. Gilson, ‘The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate
Governance Environment’, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 61, No. 161 (1992), p. 181.
49. Gregory Jackson ‘Comparative Corporate Governance: Sociological Perspectives’, in John Parkinson,
Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly (eds), The Political Economy of the Company (Hart, 2000), pp. 271–3.
50. Scott, Corporate Business and Capitalist Classes, p. 50.
51. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty (Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 59; see also Bart Noote-
boom, ‘Voice- and Exit-Based Forms of Corporate Control: Anglo-American, European, and Japanese’,
Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1999), pp. 845–60.
52. This notion of market- or exit-based control can in fact also be found in neo-classical agency theory. Fama
and Jensen, for instance, argue that ‘[t]he unrestricted alienability of the residual claims [that is, shares] of
The Marketisation of European Corporate Control
231
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
0:
49
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
open corporations’, gives these corporations a unique ‘external monitoring device’ (‘Separation of Owner-
ship and Control’, p. 16). Agency theory views this in terms of a natural and rational solution to a
problem (the agency problem), which might be blocked by the interference of politics (see Michael
Jensen, ‘Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 1
(1988), pp. 21–48), we adopt the opposite perspective inasmuch as we seek to understand how and why
this form of market rule has in fact come into being, suggesting that a political analysis is indispensable.
53. See Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, ‘Globalisation, European Integration, and the Transformation of European Cor-
porate Governance the Rise of a European Shareholder Capitalism’, paper presented at the annual convention
of the European Community Studies Association (ECSA), Madison, Wisconsin, 31 May–2 June 2001; Fab-
rizio Barca & Marco Becht (eds), The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 30.
54. See John C. Coffee, ‘Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor’, Columbia
Law Review, Vol. 91, No. 6 (1991), pp. 1277–366.
55. Martin Ho¨pner, Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen? Shareholder Value, Managerherrschaft und Mitbestim-
mung in Deutschland (Campus, 2003), p. 99.
56. See van Apeldoorn, Globalisation, European Integration, and the Transformation of European Corporate
Governance.
57. Ho¨pner, Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen?, pp. 104ff.
58. Paul Windolf, ‘Die neuen Eigentu¨mer: Eine Analyse des Marktes fu¨r Unternehmenskontrolle’, Zeitschrift fu¨r
Soziologie, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1994), p. 85; Ivo Wildenberg, De Revolte van de Kapitaalmarkt: Over Fusies,
Overnames en de Terugkeer van de Eigenaar-Ondernemer (Academic Service, 1990), p. 14.
59. Robert Fitch, ‘A Reply to O’Connor’, Socialist Register, Vol. 7 (1971), p. 166; Paul Windolf, ‘Die neuen
Eigentu¨mer’, p. 81.
60. Henry Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 73,
No. 2 (1965), p. 113; see also Jensen & Meckling, ‘The Theory of the Firm’.
61. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, NBER Working Papers, No. WSSS4
1996, p. 4.
62. John Pound, ‘The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control’, New York
University Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 5 (1993), p. 1018.
63. Ho¨pner, Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen?, p. 105.
64. Ibid., pp. 139–48.
65. Henk Overbeek & Kees van der Pijl, ‘Restructuring Capital and Restructuring Hegemony: Neoliberalism and
the Unmaking of the Postwar Order’, in Henk Overbeek (ed.), Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Pol-
itical Economy: The Rise of Transnational Neoliberalism in the 1980s (Routledge, 1993), p. 3.
66. Harvey, Limits to Capital, p. 284 (emphasis in original).
67. Overbeek & van der Pijl, ‘Restructuring Capital and Restructuring Hegemony’; Kees van der Pijl, Transna-
tional Classes and International Relations (Routledge, 1998), pp. 51–63.
68. William Lazonick & Mary O’Sullivan, ‘Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for Corporate
Governance?’, Economy and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2000), pp. 13–35; see also Fligstein, Architecture of
Markets, ch. 7; Aglietta & Rebe´rioux, Corporate Governance Adrift.
69. Van der Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations.
70. Henk W. de Jong, ‘The Governance Structure and Performance of Large European Companies’, Journal of
Management and Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1997), p. 18.
71. Lazonick & O’Sullivan, ‘Maximizing Shareholder Value’, p. 17.
72. Cf. Aglietta & Rebe´rioux, Corporate Governance Adrift; Robert Boyer, ‘Is a Finance-Led Growth Regime a
Viable Alternative to Fordism?, Economy and Society, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2000), pp. 111–45.
73. Ho¨pner, Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen?, p. 210.
74. Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p. 73.
75. Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, p. 167.
76. Including, crucially, the striking down of all state-level anti-takeover laws by the Supreme Court in 1982.
Mark Roe, ‘Takeover Politics’, in Margaret Blair (ed.), The Deal Decade (The Brookings Institution,
1993), p. 335.
77. Blair (ed.) The Deal Decade; Douglas Henwood, Wall Street.
78. Michael Useem, Executive Defense: Shareholder Power and Corporate Reorganization (Harvard University
Press, 1993); Wildenberg, De Revolte van de Kapitaalmarkt.
79. Ho¨pner & Jackson, ‘An Emerging Market for Corporate Control?’; Karel Lannoo, ‘A European Perspective
on Corporate Governance’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1999), pp. 269–94; Karel
Bastiaan van Apeldoorn & Laura Horn
232
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
0:
49
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
Lannoo & Arman Khachaturyan, Reform of Corporate Governance in the EU, Centre for European Policy
Studies Papers (CEPS, 2003).
80. Politi & Saigol, ‘Europe outpaces US in volume of deals’. The record wave of M&A activity in Europe,
including a growing number of hostile bids, also shows now sign of receding, see Politi & Saigol, ‘Rise
in hostile bids pushes M&A to Record’; Christopher Brown-Humes, ‘Debt and equity markets point to con-
tinuing boom in M&A’, Financial Times, 4 November 2006, p. 34.
81. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘Recent Trends: Institutional Investors
Statistics’, Financial Market Trends, Vol. 80, September (2001), pp. 46–52.
82. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘Shareholder Value and the Market for
Corporate Control in OECD Countries’, Financial Market Trends, Vol. 69, February (1998), pp. 15–37.
83. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), ‘The Impact of Institutional Investors on
OECD Financial Markets’, Financial Market Trends, Vol. 68, November (1997), pp. 15–55.
84. See Ho¨pner, Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen?; van Apeldoorn, ‘Globalisation, Europeanisation and the
Transformation of European Corporate Control’, Martin Rhodes & Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, ‘Capital
Unbound? The Transformation of European Corporate Governance’, Journal of European Public Policy,
Vol. 5, No. 3 (1998), pp. 406–27.
85. Alan W. Cafruny & Magnus Ryner (eds), A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in
Europe (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle
over European Integration (Routledge, 2002).
86. Hans-Ju¨rgen Bieling & Jochen Steinhilber, ‘Finanzmarktintegration und Corporate Governance in der Euro-
pa¨ischen Union’, Zeitschrift fu¨r Internationale Beziehungen, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002), p. 41 (authors’ trans-
lation). Employing the concept of a project in terms of a relatively coherent programme, however, should
not be taken to imply that there are no contradictions within the project, nor that a priori one could
expect a smooth implementation of the project.
87. For example, Wayne Sandholtz & Alec Stone Sweet (eds), European Integration and Supranational Govern-
ance (Oxford University Press, 1998).
88. Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, p. 205.
89. See van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration.
90. Hans-Ju¨rgen Bieling, ‘Social Forces in the Making of the New European Economy: The Case of Financial
Market Integration’, New Political Economy, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2003), pp. 203–24; see also Jonathan Story &
Ingo Walter, Political Economy of Financial Integration in Europe (Manchster University Press, 1997).
91. Bieling & Steinhilber, ‘Finanzmarktintegration und Corporate Governance’, p. 43; van Apeldoorn, Transna-
tional Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration.
92. European Commission, Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action
Plan, COM (1999) 232, 11 May 1999.
93. Van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism, pp. 173–80.
94. European Commission, Turning the Corner: Preparing the Challenge of the Next Phase of European Capital
Market Integration, 10th FSAP Progress Report (2004), available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
internal_market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/progress10_en.pdf (accessed 5 May 2006).
95. Frits Bolkestein, ‘Speech at Presidency Conclusion’, European Council, Lisbon, 23–4 March 2004.
96. Ibid.
97. European Commission, Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European
Union – A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final, 21 May 2003.
98. On the role of discourse in European governance compare Ben Rosamond, ‘Imagining the European
Economy: “Competetiveness” and the Social Construction of “Europe” as an Economic Space’, New
Political Economy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2002), pp. 157–77.
99. Charlie McCreevy, ‘Regulatory and Supervisory Challenges of Financial Integration’, speech at the
Lamfalussy London Summer Dinner, London, 27 June 2005.
100. See Polanyi, The Great Transformation.
101. Frits Bolkestein, ‘Corporate Governance in Europe’, speech at the FESE Conference, Amsterdam, 30
February 2003.
102. Charlie McCreevy, ‘The Commission’s Financial Services Policy 2005–2010’, Exchange of Views on
Financial Services Policy 2005–2010 Conference, Brussels, 18 July 2005 (emphasis added).
103. Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, p. 112.
104. Frits Bolkestein, ‘Keynote Speech’, FESE Convention, London, 23 June 2003.
The Marketisation of European Corporate Control
233
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
0:
49
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
105. Frits Bolkestein, ‘Speeding up the Consolidation of European Financial Markets’, speech held at the
Europlace International Financial Forum, Paris, 11 July 2002.
106. European Commission, Financial Services, p. 4.
107. Barbara Dauner-Lieb & Marco Lamandini, The New Proposal of a Directive on Company Law Concerning
Takeover Bids and the Achievement of a Level Playing Field, with Particular Reference to the Recommen-
dations of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts set up by the European Commission (European
Parliament, 2002), p. 13.
108. The implementation of the Takeover Directive was slow but was finally completed in 2006. Most Member
States have indeed opted out of the board neutrality and the breakthrough rules. For more information on the
implementation, see a report by the European Group for Investor Protection, available at http://www.egip.
org/docs/EGIP’sconclusions.pdf (accessed 7 December, 2006).
109. Silja Maul & Athanasios Kouloridas, ‘The Takeover Bids Directive’, German Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 4
(2004), p. 360.
110. McCreevy, The European Corporate Governance Action Plan.
111. Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets, p. 96.
112. See van Apeldoorn, Transnational Capitalism; Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, ‘Transnational Class Agency and
European Governance: The Case of the European Round Table of Industrialists’, New Political Economy,
Vol. 5, No. 2 (2000), pp. 157–81.
113. In this context, the role of the European Court of Justice is very important. It has repeatedly ruled against
golden shares, such as in 2002 (Case C-367/98: Commission vs. Portugal, case C-483/88: Commission vs.
France; case C-503/99: Commission vs. Belgium) and 2006 (C-283/04 Commission vs Netherlands).
114. McCreevy, The European Corporate Governance Action Plan.
115. European Commission, Fostering an Appropriate Regime for Shareholders’ Rights, consultation document
of DG Internal Market (2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/docs/
shareholders/consultation_en.pdf (accessed 5 May 2006), p. 13.
116. Charlie McCreevy, ‘Keynote Address’, speech held at the ICGN Annual Conference, London, 8 July 2005.
117. European Commission, Fostering an Appropriate Regime for Shareholders’ Rights, p. 14. In light of these
shareholder rights principles, the issue of ‘one share one vote’ has become one of the main points of debate
within the regulation of corporate control in the European Union. According to a recent study, 65 per cent of
listed companies in the EU apply the ‘one share one vote’ principle (Association of British Insurers and
Deminor Rating, Application of the One Share – One Vote Principle in Europe, 2005, available at
http://www.abi.org.uk/BookShop/ResearchReports/Deminor_Report.pdf, accessed 5 May 2006). More
than a third of listed European companies thus still have unequal voting rights. The Economist, condemning
‘Europe’s unfair voting rights’, claims that this ‘means that Europe is unlikely to develop soon the lively
market for corporate control that it urgently needs’ (The Economist, ‘Corporate governance in Europe.
What shareholder democracy?’, 23 May 2005).
118. Charlie McCreevy, ‘Interview’, Financial Times, 17 October 2005, p. 1.
119. For an overview of these debates, see Arman Khachaturyan The One Share One Vote Controversy in the
EU, EMI Working Paper No. 1 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id¼908215 (accessed 25 November 2006).
120. Ibid.
121. For critical political economy scholarship on EMU see, for instance, Hans-Ju¨rgen Bieling ‘EMU, Financial
Integration and Global Economic Governance’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 3
(2006), pp. 420–48; Alan W. Cafruny & Magnus Ryner, Europe at Bay: The Crisis of European Union
(Lynne Rienner, 2007).
122. Bieling, ‘Social Forces in the Making of the New European Economy’, p. 211.
123. See Lannoo, ‘A European Perspective on Corporate Governance’; OECD, ‘Shareholder Value and the
Market for Corporate Control in OECD Countries’.
124. On this, see also Charlie McCreevy, Statement by Charlie McCreevy on the Adoption of the European
Parliament Opinion on the Cross-Border Mergers Directive, Brussels, IP/05/551(2005).
125. Bernard S. Black, ‘The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets’, UCLA Law
Review, Vol. 48 (2001), pp. 781–805.
126. Frits Bolkestein, ‘The EU Action Plan for Corporate Governance’, speech held at the Conference on the
German Corporate Governance Code, Berlin, 24 June 2004.
127. Charlie McCreevy, ‘Europe must embrace market forces’, Financial Times, 12 May 2005, p. 19.
Bastiaan van Apeldoorn & Laura Horn
234
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
0:
49
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
128. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance (OECD, 2004), p. 36.
129. Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets, p. 5.
130. See the Commission’s proposal COM (2005) 685 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
site/en/com/2005/com2005_0685en01.pdf
131. McCreevy, The Commission’s Financial Services Policy.
132. Christopher Gibson-Smith, ‘Brussels can help the markets to help themselves’, Financial Times, 27 July
2005, p. 17.
133. More empirical research underlining the role of transnational capital market actors in the politics of the
transformation of corporate governance regulation can be found in Overbeek et al., Transnational Politics
of Corporate Governance Regulation.
The Marketisation of European Corporate Control
235
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
0:
49
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
